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INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented trend of lengthy incarceration in the United States
has produced a disturbing byproduct: the use of long-term solitary
confinement. The precise number of people held in solitary confinement is
notoriously difficult to determine due to a lack of reliable recordkeeping
within institutions and varied terminology among states, but experts believe
that tens of thousands of people are held in “restricted housing.”1 Of those
people, many reside long-term in so-called segregation—a practice that
removes an inmate from the general prison population to a segregated
housing unit and is justified as an administrative measure to maintain safety
for inmates and prison officers alike. 2 Segregation placement severely
restricts an inmate’s contact with other people and with the outside world.3
Although prisons employ various types of segregation placements and
different states term segregation differently, this Comment addresses the
1 See Angela Browne et al., Prisons Within Prisons: The Use of Segregation in the United States, 24
FED. SENT’G REP. 46, 46 (2011) (citing JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 222182, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES, 2005 (2008)). Experts believe about 80,000 people are held in restricted housing. See id.
2 This Comment addresses facilities in which an inmate is placed in an isolated unit,
separated from the general prison population, and deprived of normal prison privileges and
activities. Segregated housing units (SHUs) may also be called “secure housing units,” “special
housing units,” and “security housing units.” Supermax prisons have the same characteristics for
the purposes of this analysis. For a basic overview of different types of facilities and segregation
categories, see id. at 47. For a description of the general conditions within these units, see infra
note 17 and accompanying text.
3 See infra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the typical conditions of segregated
confinement).
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use of segregated housing that consists of the “housing of a prisoner in
conditions characterized by substantial isolation from other prisoners” due
to disciplinary or administrative findings. 4 Segregation falls within two
general categories depending on the stated reason for the placement decision:
disciplinary and administrative.5 Placement in disciplinary segregation occurs
when a prisoner is temporarily removed from the general prison population as
punishment for bad behavior.6 Although definitions vary among facilities,7
courts and scholars generally use the term “administrative segregation” to
mean segregation placement for a reason other than bad behavior. 8 In
contrast with disciplinary segregation, long-term administrative
segregation—and extended long-term segregation in particular—is justified
not on the grounds of disciplinary action, but instead by a perceived threat that
the prisoner poses to himself or others. Administrative segregation decisions
are justified not by an inmate’s past conduct, but rather by predictions about an

4 Margo Schlanger, Regulating Segregation: The Contribution of the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2010) (quoting ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-1.0(r) (2010)). For
the purposes of this Comment, segregation and solitary confinement are interchangeable terms.
5 See Fred Cohen, Isolation in Penal Settings: The Isolation–Restraint Paradigm, 22 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 295, 299-300 (2006) (“Administrative segregation terms generally are indefinite,
although some administrative review process may be required. On the other hand, . . .
disciplinary segregation terms tend to be definite [and last for a shorter amount of time].”).
Although these categorical terms invoke different legal doctrines and standards, administrative
segregation and disciplinary segregation often involve the same restrictive conditions of
confinement. For a description of the general differences between the two classifications, see infra
note 8. See generally infra subsection I.B.2.a (discussing due process protections for punitive
segregation).
6 Disciplinary segregation is a common punitive tool prison officials use. For a critical
analysis of the use of disciplinary segregation in California, see Zafir Shaiq, Note, More Restrictive
Than Necessary: A Policy Review of Secure Housing Units, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 327,
337 (2013) (“[T]he application of . . . [disciplinary SHU placement] is less than logical.
Qualifying offenses include tattooing, possession of over five dollars without authorization,
gambling, throwing anything on a nonprisoner, and theft.”).
7 States try to draw distinctions between disciplinary segregation, imposed as punishment for
rules violations, and administrative segregation, imposed when a facility determines that the
inmate’s “presence in general [prison] population would pose a threat to the safety and security of
the facility.” Cohen, supra note 5, at 299 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. vii,
§ 301.4(b) (2002)).
8 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (“The phrase ‘administrative
segregation’ . . . appears to be something of a catchall: it may be used to protect the prisoner’s
safety, to protect other inmates from a particular prisoner, to break up potentially disruptive
groups of inmates, or simply to await later classification or transfer.”); see also John J. Gibbons &
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement: A Report of the Commission on Safety and Abuse
in America’s Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 462-63 (2006) (distinguishing disciplinary
segregation from administrative segregation).
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inmate’s future behavior. 9 Inmates placed in administrative segregation
belong to some of the most vulnerable populations within a prison,
including people struggling with substance abuse and mental illness.10
Assignment to administrative segregation occurs when a prison
administrator deems a person a threat to himself, other inmates, or prison
officials. Prison administrators often use gang affiliation as a proxy for
dangerousness, frequently resulting in the administrative segregation
placement of individuals solely due to their affiliation with gangs.11
Although officials justify indefinite segregation as a last resort for the
most dangerous inmates, the security classification processes, discussed at
length in subsection II.B.1, are imperfect.12 Once a determination is made,
the inmate is removed from the general prison population and placed into
segregated housing of some form—either in a facility that exclusively
houses segregated prisoners,13 or a special unit within the prison dedicated
to segregated prisoners. In the segregated facility, the inmate is “deprived of
almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human
contact”14 and restricted to small, bare cells, often lacking windows or access

9 See James E. Robertson, The Constitutional Rights of an Inmate at an Administrative Segregation
Proceeding: Hewitt v. Helms and the Withdrawal of Prisoners’ Rights, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 57, 59
(1984) (noting the theoretical predictive basis for administrative segregation decisions but
suggesting that predictive capacity is limited in practice).
10 See Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
259, 323 (2011) (“The people slated for supermax, having been culled from the prison’s general
population, are already disproportionately likely to be grappling with incapacities like drug
addiction, mental illness, and learning disabilities.”). For a disturbing account of the placement
and treatment of mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement, see Elizabeth Alexander & Patricia
Streeter, Isolated Confinement in Michigan: Mapping the Circles of Hell, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 251,
257-62 (2013). For an overview of expert commentary on the impact of solitary confinement on an
inmate’s metal health, see Emily Coffey, Madness in the Hole: Solitary Confinement and Mental
Health of Prison Inmates, 18 PUB. INT. L. REP. 17, 19 (2012).
11 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 320 (“The explicit predicate for separating and isolating gang
members is a prediction of future violence and the need for preventative action.”). Cohen argues,
however, that segregation placement based on gang affiliation is improper, noting that “‘gang’ is a
rather loose term encompassing just about any group whose members commit crimes” and that
separation is not necessarily the best strategy for gang control. Id.; see also infra Section III.A.
12 See Joseph B. Allen, Note, Extending Hope Into “The Hole”: Applying Graham v. Florida to
Supermax Prisons, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 217, 218 (2011) (“Although states originally
designed the facilities for only the most dangerous and violent inmates, lower threat-level inmates
occasionally find themselves assigned to supermax facilities for prolonged periods of time.”).
13 California’s Pelican Bay SHU, discussed at length in Section II.B, infra, and supermax
prisons, such as the Ohio State Penitentiary at issue in Wilkinson v. Austin, are examples of this
approach. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005) (“Supermax facilities are maximumsecurity prisons with highly restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous
prisoners from the general prison population.”).
14 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214.
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to natural light, for twenty-two to twenty-four hours per day. 15
Confinement is typically indefinite and may last for a prolonged period of
time.16 Inmates are deprived of meaningful human contact; they have only
“fleeting” interactions with prison staff and rarely have contact with other
inmates or visitors because “[v]irtually no outsiders have access to the parts
of correctional facilities that house . . . segregated inmates.”17
Long-term prison segregation, unlike disciplinary segregation, therefore
assumes a unique role: prison administrators are empowered to remove
people from the general prison population (and therefore distinguish their
punishment from the normal prison experience), often without an
affirmative action on the part of the prisoner. Mere affiliation with a group
or even general disposition can warrant placement in a severely restrictive
and isolated confinement setting. This Comment focuses on administrative
placements based on “affiliation”—that is, placements of individuals alleged
to be affiliated with groups that prison officials deem dangerous.
Placement in segregation, particularly when it is indefinite and
prolonged, not only curtails an inmate’s access to other prisoners, mental
and physical stimulation, and, in many instances, natural light, but it also
15 See, e.g., Lorna A. Rhodes, Changing the Subject: Conversation in Supermax, 20 CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 388, 406 n.6 (2005) (“The essential features are isolation, intensive surveillance,
and elaborate precautions against assault and escape whenever prisoners are out of their cells.”);
Lorna A. Rhodes, Dreaming of Psychiatric Citizenship: A Case Study of Supermax Confinement
(“Supermax prisoners are confined for twenty-three or more hours a day in small single cells and
removed—cuffed, tethered and under escort—only for brief showers or solitary exercise. Their
lives are characterized by lack of physical and mental stimulation, minimal social contact, and
extreme dependence on prison staff.”), in A READER IN MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY:
THEORETICAL TRAJECTORIES, EMERGENT REALITIES 181, 184 (Byron J. Good et al. eds., 2010).
Although some aspects of solitary confinement have changed since the early nineteenth
century when the practice was introduced in the U.S. penal system, many elements remain the
same. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 301; John F. Cockrell, Note, Solitary Confinement: The Law Today
and the Way Forward, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 212-13 (2013). Indeed, the primary difference
between the solitary confinement of the past and the segregation of today is in its justification: in
the nineteenth century facilities, inmates could work and “there was, however misguided, a
reformative ideal upon which the practice was predicated. . . . Penal isolation today offers no
pretense of reformation and provides no vocational options . . . .” Cohen, supra note 5, at 301
(footnotes omitted).
16 In this Comment, I adopt a definition of long-term segregation that reflects the plaintiff
class in Ashker v. Brown: confinement in a segregated housing unit for a decade or longer. See
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 2, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-5796 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10,
2012), ECF No. 136 (describing the class members’ confinement of at least a decade as
“unconscionably long”).
17 Michele Deitch, Special Populations and the Importance of Prison Oversight, 37 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 291, 297 (2010); see also Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 11 (“The
remote location of Pelican Bay means that most SHU prisoners receive no visits with family
members or friends . . . . Many prisoners have thus been without face-to-face contact with
people other than prison staff for decades.”).
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significantly alters the prisoner’s carceral experience. In addition to Eighth
Amendment concerns, 18 placement into administrative segregation also
implicates the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.19
The harshness of segregation placement as an administrative safety tool
is generally grossly disproportionate to the threat that many prisoners—
including alleged gang members—pose to themselves or others. 20 This
reflects not only the imperfect and inadequate classification tools prison
officials employ to determine inmate threat levels,21 but also the overly
restrictive conditions of segregated confinement that far surpass any danger
an inmate may pose.22 As a result of these failures, “[t]he segregation units
of American prisons are full not of Hannibal Lecters but of the young, the
pathetic, the mentally ill.”23
In light of these extreme conditions and the great impact they can have
on a prisoner’s confinement experience, the procedures regarding placement
that are afforded to prisoners placed in segregated housing are of the utmost
importance. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s longstanding tradition of
deferring to prison officials has limited the procedural protections prisoners
can demand under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
By emphasizing that the procedural guarantee of due process is flexible, the
Court has sanctioned segregation decisions as long as the placement
involves some form of “meaningful review.”25 The Court has refrained from
defining the requisite process or investigating how a prison’s stated
procedures actually function on an individual inmate level, however,
rendering meaningful review meaningless.
The Court’s doctrinal reluctance to articulate a bright line rule regarding
the process due to prisoners placed in administrative segregation has therefore
encouraged creative litigation strategies regarding long-term segregation
18 Although outside the scope of this Comment, there are significant Eighth Amendment
concerns relating to long-term solitary confinement. See Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement
and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 117-25 (2008); see also Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 16, at 36.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 300 (“[T]he harm caused by extended isolation under the most
straightened or barbaric conditions is not related to any rationale for the isolation.”); Schlanger,
supra note 4, at 1421 (“Too many prisoners are housed in [segregation units] for too long, in
conditions whose harshness stems more from criminal-justice politics than from correctional
necessity or even usefulness.”).
21 See infra Section III.A.
22 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23 Schlanger, supra note 4, at 1432 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
25 See infra subsection I.B.2.b.
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placement and review.26 This Comment examines these strategies and the
implications that these approaches have on the current state of Supreme
Court doctrine. Through analysis of a pending class action suit, Ashker v.
Brown, 27 this Comment examines the current state of the due process
doctrine for prisoners seeking to challenge their placement and prolonged
confinement in the severely restrictive environment of administrative
segregation.
This Comment considers the actual procedural due process protections
afforded to prisoners placed in segregated housing for nondisciplinary
reasons. Part I examines the procedural protections afforded to inmates
generally and prisoners placed in administrative segregation in particular. In
addition, Part I explores the doctrinal limitations on due process challenges
relating to administrative segregation. Part II chronicles recent
developments in inmate litigation, in which litigants have alleged due
process violations despite these limitations. Part II also evaluates the state
of the doctrine through an analysis of recent litigation strategies,
highlighting Ashker v. Brown as a model. Finally, Part III recommends
changes to the Court’s approach to administrative segregation due process
challenges.
I. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN THE PRISON CONTEXT
A. Determination of Process Due: An Outline of the Constitutional Framework
There are two key steps in assessing an alleged due process violation.
First, a court must determine whether the government conduct in question
impairs a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.28 The Court has explained that “[a] liberty
interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees
implicit in the word ‘liberty,’”29 or through guarantees derived from state
law—even when the right would not otherwise command constitutional
protection.30 Second, if the government conduct implicates a protected
26
27
28

See infra Section II.B.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16.
The Court has determined that the range of directly protected liberty interests is narrow.
See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (“[I]t is well settled that only a limited range
of interests fall within [the due process] provision.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)
(“We reject . . . the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient
to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.”).
29 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
30 See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466 (“Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
may arise from two sources—the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.”); see also
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liberty interest, the court must weigh the three factors in the Mathews v.
Eldridge balancing test:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.31

The Court has emphasized that “due process is flexible” and requires a
situation-specific determination of necessary procedural safeguards.32 As a
result, when assessing prisoners’ due process challenges, the Court has
noted the unique posture of inmates’ procedural guarantees.33 The Court
has refrained from finding a liberty interest directly implicated by the Due
Process Clause “in itself ” for most liberty interests asserted by inmates,
instead locating protectable liberty interests in state-created rights.34 The
Court has repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to interfere with states’
decisions in the prison context, holding that “[t]he Due Process Clause
standing alone confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“[A] person’s liberty is equally protected, even when
the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State.”).
31 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
32 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“It has been said so often by this Court and
others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333
(“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).
33 See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 212 (“[C]ourts must give substantial deference to prison management decisions before mandating . . . elaborate procedural safeguards . . . .”); see also Myra A.
Sutanto, Note, Wilkinson v. Austin and the Quest for a Clearly Defined Liberty Interest Standard, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1029, 1032, 1041-42 (2006) (discussing the more relaxed approach to
due process guarantees afforded to inmates and explaining that unlike free citizens, inmates have
presumably received procedural due process already—namely, a trial).
34 See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (“As long as the conditions or degree of
confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is
not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an
inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of
the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (finding “no constitutional or inherent
right” to the initial grant of parole); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (“We have
rejected the notion that every state action carrying adverse consequences for prison inmates
automatically activates a due process right.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (finding
no constitutional protection against prison transfers within the same state prison system); Wolff,
418 U.S. at 557 (finding no constitutional guarantee of good time credits earned for good behavior
in prison).
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within the sentence imposed.”35 The court then must assess whether the
procedures the prison administrators have in place are adequate, applying
the standard Mathews balancing test.36
Even if a court determines a liberty interest is at stake, the procedures
required to constitutionally infringe upon it are modest at best: “In the
prison context . . . due process is satisfied by providing ‘notice of the
factual basis’ for an inmate’s placement and ‘allowing the inmate a rebuttal
opportunity.’” 37 These limited procedural protections reflect the Court’s
decision that an inmate’s interest in the specific conditions of his
confinement are narrow in comparison to the state’s interest in maintaining
safety and preserving resources.38
Prison imposes a unique restraint on individual liberty. Individuals in
prison have already lost much of their liberty after judicial proceedings and
have benefited from the strict procedural guarantees attached to criminal
trials. 39 Prisoners, the Court has repeatedly emphasized, are individuals
whose liberties have been intentionally curtailed and whose current
positions are the very articulation of that constitutionally secured
curtailment. 40 Within this unique context, the Court has often granted
broad deference to prison officials to manage a prisoner’s confinement as
prison officials see fit.41
35 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468).
36 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35; see also Prieto v. Clarke, No. 12-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *9
(E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (“[A prisoner’s] constitutional rights are not violated by the imposition of
the . . . hardship itself, but by the imposition of that hardship without sufficient procedural
protections.”).
37 Prieto, 2013 WL 6019215, at *10 (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225-26).
38 See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225-29 (applying the Mathews analysis to justify the limited
procedural protections afforded to inmates); Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 467 (“We have repeatedly said
both that prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the
institutions they manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of
protected liberty interests.”).
39 See Kaitlin Cassel, Note, Due Process in Prison: Protecting Inmates’ Property After Sandin v.
Conner, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2110, 2118 (2012) (“[A] prison sentence, imposed after a full criminal
trial, greatly restricts a prisoner’s liberty.”).
40 See Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (granting deference to prison officials
“[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within
the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution”); see also Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (“Undoubtedly, a valid criminal conviction and prison sentence
extinguish a defendant’s right to freedom from confinement.”).
41 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (holding that a prisoner’s limited
due process guarantees are still “subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to
which they have been lawfully committed”). Some courts have narrowly interpreted the deference
afforded prison officials. The Sixth Circuit, for example, concluded in Gibbs v. Hopkins that while
prison officials are permitted some latitude in prison administration, the courts “may not simply
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B. Recent Developments in Due Process Jurisprudence in the Prison Context
The two-pronged approach the Court uses to assess due process
protections has undergone substantial modification over the past two
decades. This Section examines those changes for each prong of the
analysis.
1. Prong One: Finding a Liberty Interest
a. Before Sandin: The Rise of the State Positive Law Approach
The threshold inquiry that a court must answer when deciding a due
process question is whether the state action in question implicates a
protected liberty interest.42 A liberty interest must meet a high bar for the
Court to find it protected under the Due Process Clause itself.43 In the
prison context in particular, the Due Process Clause protects most liberty
interests asserted by prisoners when the state has created a right or
guarantee for prisoners.44 The original approach to finding a state-created
liberty interest, adopted by the Court in a flurry of decisions in the 1970s
and 1980s,45 required courts to assess state statutory or regulatory language

defer to [prison officials’] judgment on the basis of administrative discretion” and that “the Due
Process Clause requires at the very least some minimal inquiry by the courts sworn to enforce its
guarantees.” 10 F.3d 373, 379 (6th Cir. 1993).
42 See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466 (noting that “only a limited range of interests” enjoy
protection under the Due Process Clause); Scott F. Weisman, Note, Sandin v. Conner: Lowering
the Boom on the Procedural Rights of Prisoners, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 897, 901-02 (1997) (explaining the
development of the two-pronged approach).
43 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; see also Donna H. Lee, The Law of Typicality:
Examining the Procedural Due Process Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 785,
786 (2004) (“The scope of the constitutional prohibition against any state taking of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, depends on the meaning of life, liberty and property, and
courts have traditionally used state law to inform and expand the definition of these concepts.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
44 Cf. supra note 34 and accompanying text. But see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782
(1973) (holding that “a probationer . . . is entitled to a . . . revocation hearing”); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that a parolee is entitled to “some orderly process”
before revocation of parole because “the liberty of a parolee . . . includes many of the core values
of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
45 According to James Robertson, this trend, which he terms the “entitlement analysis”
approach, gained force after Meachum v. Fano and throughout the late 1970s, culminating in the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of the approach in 1983 in Hewitt v. Helms. Robertson, supra note 9,
at 62-68. Robertson argues that the lower courts “had begun to erode the long-standing barrier
between administrative segregation decisions and due process of law,” but that Hewitt limited this
expansion of prisoners’ access to procedural due process. Id. at 64-70. In Sandin v. Conner,
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to determine whether such an interest existed.46 The Court reasoned that a
state creates a liberty interest when the language of a regulation or statute is
sufficiently mandatory as to encourage reliance upon its guarantees.47
In Hewitt v. Helms, the Court rejected the existence of a prisoner’s liberty
interest in “being confined to a general population cell, rather than the more
austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters” as a right implied
in the Due Process Clause.48 Instead, the Court looked to the statutory
measures regarding administrative segregation,49 ultimately concluding that
the prisoner did “acquire a protected liberty interest in remaining in the
general prison population.”50
The Court’s positivist approach, as the reasoning in Hewitt demonstrates,
turned on whether the state statutory language was sufficiently compulsory to
create a liberty entitlement.51 Thus, the existence of a state-created liberty
interest depended upon the precise statutory language at issue. Courts had
to analyze the language of state regulations and statutes to discern whether
the measure was permissive or discretionary (rendering an entitlement
claim invalid), or sufficiently mandatory (supporting a liberty interest
claim) as a touchstone of its due process analysis.52 Under this approach, the
Court found that an inmate had a state-created liberty interest in remaining
in the general prison population53 and in earned good-time credits54 but did
not find a liberty interest in a prisoner’s initial grant of parole55 or the

discussed in subsection I.B.1.b, infra, the Court implied that this trend arose from a misreading of
dictum in Meachum. 515 U.S. 472, 479 (1995).
46 For a description of this process, see Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 469, which explains that “a State
may create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause through its enactment of certain
statutory or regulatory measures.”
47 Id. at 472.
48 Id. at 466-67.
49 See id. at 469-70 (examining a Pennsylvania statute to determine whether it created a
liberty entitlement).
50 Id. at 470-71.
51 See Lee, supra note 43, at 796-98 (describing the Court’s use of state law to analyze
prisoners’ due process rights and arguing the approach came to “full fruition” in Hewitt).
52 Cf. id. at 799 (pointing out that “the Hewitt decision contained a blueprint for limiting
state-created liberty interests” by directing state administrative agencies to “substitute permissive
language such as ‘may’ or ‘should’ for the mandatory language flagged by the Court as giving rise
to liberty interests”).
53 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 470-71.
54 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974); see also Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 469 (“[I]n
Wolff, where we rejected any notion of an interest in good-time credits inherent in the
Constitution, we also found that Nebraska had created a right to such credits.”).
55 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is
no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the
expiration of a valid sentence.”).
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transfer from one institution to another within the same state prison
system. 56 The distinguishing feature of the latter two interests was the
discretionary language within the relevant state regulatory measures.57
b. Sandin v. Conner and the Move Away from Statutory Interpretation
The Court revisited the threshold inquiry due process analysis in Sandin
v. Conner.58 Sandin involved a due process claim by DeMont Conner, a
prisoner who had been placed in thirty-day disciplinary segregation for
misconduct. 59 Conner alleged that he was deprived of procedural due
process in the disciplinary hearing that resulted in his segregation
placement.60 Conner argued that he was entitled to procedural due process
before facing any punitive actions by the state.61
The Court began its analysis by chronicling the state of the prisoner
procedural due process doctrine.62 Noting that the widespread adoption of
the Hewitt approach had erroneously encouraged “the search for a negative
implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations” as the
primary concern of the due process inquiry, the Court in Sandin signaled a
change of course.63 Indeed, the Court concluded that the Hewitt approach
had “produced at least two undesirable effects.”64
The first effect, as the Court explained, was that the approach “create[d]
disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the
interest of uniform treatment.”65 The second effect, according to the Sandin
Court, was that “the Hewitt approach . . . led to the involvement of federal
courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial
resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone.”66
56
57

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
See Lee, supra note 43, at 799 (explaining that the Court’s state-created liberty interestbased analysis incentivized states’ use of discretionary language to avoid creating constitutionally
protected liberty interests).
58 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (explaining the need for an alternative approach given the
“undesirable effects” of Hewitt).
59 Id. at 474-76.
60 Id. at 475-77.
61 Id. at 484.
62 See id. at 477-83 (discussing the due process framework for a prisoner’s procedural
challenges, beginning with the standards set forth in Wolff and concluding with the problematic
results of Hewitt).
63 Id. at 483.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 482 (“States may avoid creation of ‘liberty’ interests by having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring standardless discretion on correctional personnel.”).
66 Id. This sentiment reflects growing frustration with the amount of time spent on prison
litigation and the perception that prison litigation was flooding the federal court system. For a
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Although the Court in Sandin declined to overrule Hewitt to the extent
that it sanctioned state positive-law analysis,67 it began a paradigmatic shift
in the standard for prisoner procedural due process. The Court rejected the
notion that mandatory language in prison regulations is the touchstone for
whether an inmate has a liberty interest at stake.68 Further, the Court held
that discipline by prison officials “falls within the expected perimeters of the
sentence imposed by a court of law” and that Conner’s interest in avoiding
disciplinary segregation was therefore unprotected by the Due Process
Clause.69
As a result, the Sandin Court redefined the standard for the liberty
interest inquiry in the prison context. Rather than look to statutory
language, the Court directed courts to instead examine whether the state
action “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life” so as to create a liberty interest in
its avoidance.70 The Court reached its conclusion by comparing disciplinary
segregation conditions with other segregated confinements (such as
administrative segregation), noting that general population prisoners
commonly experienced some period of segregated confinement during their
incarceration and explaining that Conner’s placement did not impact the
duration of his incarceration.71 In its holding, the Court signaled a return to
an examination of the “nature of the deprivation” at issue, rather than the
regulatory language.72
Sandin, while an attempt to clarify—and limit—the due process
protections available to prisoners, created its own problems.73 The Court
announced a standard requiring a comparative analysis, but failed to define

thorough examination of inmate litigation and the “sea change” that occurred in 1996 with the
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), see Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1633-44 (2003).
67 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483 n.5 (“Such abandonment of Hewitt’s methodology does not
technically require us to overrule any holding of this Court.”).
68 See id. at 483.
69 Id. at 485-86 (“We hold that Conner’s discipline in segregated confinement did not present
the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest.”).
70 Id. at 484.
71 Id. at 483-87. The Court discussed the possible impact of disciplinary segregation on
Conner’s parole eligibility, but concluded that any impact was “too attenuated” to invoke the
procedural guarantees described in Wolff. Id. at 487.
72 See id. at 480-81 (recounting the shift in focus from the “nature of the deprivation” to
analysis of the language of state regulations and announcing a return to the original approach).
73 For a critique of Sandin, see Michelle C. Ciszak, Note, Sandin v. Conner: Locking Out
Prisoners’ Due Process Claims, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1139-41 (1996).
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what exactly the Court wanted lower courts to compare.74 The Court failed
to define the baseline for “atypical and significant hardship,”75 leaving the
task of determining the baseline comparison and defining typical and
insignificant deprivations to the lower courts.76
c. Long-Term Confinement Post-Sandin: What is Atypical and Significant?
Ten years later, the Court revisited the Sandin standard in Wilkinson v.
Austin.77 The Court held that an inmate had a liberty interest in avoiding
assignment to the state’s supermax prison, the Ohio State Penitentiary
(OSP).78 In its unanimous opinion, the Court noted that incarceration in
OSP is for an indefinite period, “synonymous with extreme isolation,” and
deprives inmates “of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of
almost all human contact.”79 An inmate placed at OSP is not only subjected to
these conditions, but also rendered ineligible for parole for the duration of
the inmate’s incarceration at the supermax facility.80
74 See Philip W. Sbaratta, Note, Sandin v. Conner: The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of Prisoners’
Due Process and the Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 744, 766-67
(1996) (highlighting the vagueness of the Court’s “atypicality” standard).
75 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
76 This predictably led to disagreement over the appropriate baseline. Compare Beverati v.
Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A]lthough the conditions [of administrative
segregation] were more burdensome than those imposed on the general prison population, they
were not so atypical that exposure to them for six months imposed a significant hardship in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”), with Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir.
1997) (indicating that administrative segregation provides a benchmark against which to compare
disciplinary segregation). See generally Hatch v. Dist. of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (highlighting the difficulty of applying the Sandin standard).
77 545 U.S. 209 (2005). For an outline of the procedural posture of the case, see Andrew J.
Theis, Note, The Gang’s All Here: How the Supreme Court’s Unanimous Holding in Wilkinson v.
Austin Utilizes Supermax Facilities to Combat Prison Gangs and Other Security Threats, 29 HAMLINE
L. REV. 145, 152-56 (2006).
78 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24.
79 Id. at 214. The Court began its opinion with a detailed description of life at OSP:

Inmates must remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day.
A light remains on in the cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed, and an
inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further discipline.
During the one hour per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is limited to
one of two indoor recreation cells.
. . . OSP cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and
bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals
are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a common eating area.
Opportunities for visitation are rare and in all events are conducted through glass
walls.
Id.

80

Id. at 224 (“[P]lacement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration.”).
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Noting the standard announced in Sandin, the Court in Wilkinson
concluded that assignment to OSP “imposes an atypical and significant
hardship under any plausible baseline.” 81 While many of the individual
features of confinement that the Court highlighted at OSP are shared by
other solitary confinement facilities, the Court found that they satisfied
Sandin’s comparative standard when combined—particularly the indefinite
duration of the placement (compared with the thirty-day segregation
placement in Sandin) and the resulting disqualification for parole
consideration.82
The conclusory language of the Wilkinson holding provided little
guidance for lower courts. 83 The Court failed to clarify the standard
announced in Sandin or provide specific guidance for conducting the
“atypical and significant hardship” comparative analysis.84
Not surprisingly, the circuit courts disagree about the appropriate
baseline from which to apply the Sandin standard: the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits consider general prison conditions;85 the Sixth Circuit focuses on
“typical segregation conditions;” 86 the Seventh Circuit looks at prison
conditions throughout the state;87 the Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits look
81
82

Id. at 223.
Id. at 223-24 (“While any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create
a liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the
correctional context.”). The Court’s emphasis on the combination of these two factors to satisfy
the Sandin standard suggests an implicit move away from the doctrinal stance of the “parole cases.”
See Sutanto, supra note 33, at 1044 (“The reasoning of the parole cases (Wolff, Morrissey, and
Greenholtz) suggests that the loss of parole eligibility is independently sufficient to invoke a liberty
interest, separate from the atypical hardship imposed by the confinement rule articulated in
Sandin. Instead, in Austin, the Court ruled that the loss of parole eligibility was merely an
important factor to consider when determining whether a liberty interest existed.” (footnote
omitted)).
83 See Sutanto, supra note 33, at 1046 (detailing the circuit split that arose after Sandin and
remarking that Wilkinson failed to resolve the dispute). But see Sharif A. Jacob, Note, The Rebirth of
Morrissey: Towards a Coherent Theory of Due Process for Prisoners and Parolees, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
1213, 1234 (2006) (arguing that the rejection of the state positive law approach “provides a coherent
theory of due process that expands protections for prisoners”).
84 See Sutanto, supra note 33, at 1046.
85 Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089
(9th Cir. 1996) (“The Sandin Court seems to suggest that a major difference between the
conditions for the general prison population and the segregated population triggers a right to a
hearing.”).
86 Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 353 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The district court . . . properly
made factual findings as to the conditions in OSP compared to the conditions in other Ohio
prisons, specifically in the segregated units of maximum-security prisons, the most severe nonOSP conditions in the Ohio system.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 545 U.S. 209, 230 (2005).
87 Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We do not think that comparison can
be limited to conditions in the same prison, unless it’s the state’s most secure one.”).
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to administrative segregation conditions;88 and the Fifth Circuit assesses
only whether segregation placement will lengthen the prisoner’s sentence.89
Sandin’s and Wilkinson’s vaguenesses, however, permit creative readings
of the standard. In a recent decision, for example, a district court granted
summary judgment to an inmate plaintiff, Alfredo Prieto, who had been
confined in segregation for five years without any process or review. 90
Unlike the plaintiffs in Wilkinson, however, Prieto was placed in segregation
automatically because he was facing a death sentence.91 The court applied
the “atypical and significant” standard to conclude that Prieto had a liberty
interest in avoiding placement in the segregation conditions of death row.92
The court emphasized that “[t]here is no futility exception to the Due
Process Clause”93 and found that the state’s automatic placement policy for
capital offenders “fails to provide even the most basic procedural
protections.”94
Because the Court declined in Sandin and again in Wilkinson to articulate
the appropriate baseline for typical and insignificant confinement
conditions, the question of whether placement in segregated confinement
implicates a liberty interest varies based on federal jurisdiction, which
produces absurd differences across circuit lines.95
Furthermore, even though Wilkinson provided an outline of the general
features of segregated confinement that could possibly serve as a guide for
future prisoner due process claims regarding segregation placements, the

88 See Hatch v. Dist. of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (using as a baseline
“the most restrictive confinement conditions that prison officials, exercising their administrative
authority to ensure institutional safety and good order, routinely impose on inmates serving
similar sentences”); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (indicating that normal
segregation conditions should be the baseline for comparison when segregation is within the
expected parameters of a prison sentence); Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1997)
(suggesting that the appropriate comparison for disciplinary segregation is administrative
segregation).
89 Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (indicating that segregation did not
implicate the Due Process Clause because it did not affect the length of an inmate’s time in
prison).
90 Prieto v. Clarke, No. 12-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *7, *11 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013).
91 Id. at *1.
92 Id. at *9.
93 Id. at *11.
94 Id. at *10.
95 Sutanto, supra note 33, at 1047 (“[T]he liberty to which a prisoner may be entitled depends
on the federal judicial jurisdiction in which the prison is found.” (emphasis omitted)). For an
alternative balancing test that draws on state practices, a de minimis threshold, and state positive
law, see Lee, supra note 43, at 835-37.
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murky bounds of typicality remain unclear.96 The Court failed to provide
any guidance—even for prisoners similarly situated to the inmate–plaintiffs
in Wilkinson—as to how common a confinement practice must be before it
becomes typical—and therefore unrestricted—under the Sandin standard.
2. Prong Two: Process Due
If a court determines that the deprivation alleged by the prisoner
implicates a protectable liberty interest, the court must proceed to the
second prong of the Mathews due process analysis: an inquiry into what
procedure is constitutionally necessary before depriving a person of the
liberty interest and whether the process in place, if any, is sufficient. As
discussed above, the Supreme Court has limited the spectrum of protectable
liberty interests for prisoners.97 Furthermore, even in cases where the Court
has found a liberty interest, the Court has all but precluded prisoners from
succeeding on due process claims.98 For example, the Court’s deference to
prison officials and limited requirement of process for prison decisions
prevented the inmates in Wilkinson from succeeding on their claim, even
though their segregation placement constituted a deprivation severe enough
to meet the threshold liberty interest inquiry.99 This subsection outlines the
standard for procedural due process in the prison context and highlights the
Court’s decisions granting broad discretion to prison officials in handling
administrative procedures.
a. The Court’s Approach to Prison Procedure and the Difference Between
Administrative and Punitive Segregation
The Supreme Court has suggested that the procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment for prisoners seeking relief from
segregation placement varies depending upon the nature of the segregation
categorization. 100 The Court has maintained that “[t]he fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.” 101 This emphasis on flexibility with
96 See Lindsey Webb, The Procedural Due Process Rights of the Stigmatized Prisoner, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1055, 1071-73 (2013) (discussing the problems with the atypical and significant hardship
standard and the inconsistencies resulting from its varied application).
97 See supra subsection I.B.1.
98 See supra subsection I.B.2.
99 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228 (2005) (“[C]ourts must give substantial deference
to prison management decisions before mandating . . . elaborate procedural safeguards . . . .”).
100 See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
101 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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respect to procedural standards highlights the Court’s reluctance to require
strict per se procedures for various deprivations, especially in the prison
context. 102 Instead, the Court examines particular procedures using the
balancing test that it announced in Mathews v. Eldridge.103 Accordingly, in
the prison context, due process is satisfied if the prison administration
provides “notice of the factual basis for an inmate’s placement and allow[s]
the inmate a rebuttal opportunity.”104
The Mathews framework requires consideration of three factors: (1) the
(inmate’s) private interest affected by the state action; (2) the risk of
“erroneous deprivation” of that interest through the current procedures
employed by the state; and (3) the state’s interest in the action, including
the function of the deprivation and the “fiscal and administrative burdens”
that additional or different procedures would require. 105 In the prison
context, the Court has consistently found that notice of the factual basis for
a placement decision and an opportunity to rebut that basis are “among the
most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous
deprivations.”106 The Court has relied upon the third Mathews factor to
justify this minimal procedural requirement, finding in Wilkinson, for
example, that the state’s strong interest in prison security and the “problem
of scarce resources” were reason enough to find that due process had been
met.107
The peak of procedural protections afforded to prisoners arose in the
parole context. In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court held that due process
compels specific procedural requirements before parole revocation.108 The
102 See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224 (“[W]e generally have declined to establish rigid rules and
instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures.”).
103 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
104 Prieto v. Clarke, No. 12-1199, 2013 WL 6019215, at *10 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2013) (quoting
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225-26) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
106 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (accepting procedures at parole hearings that allow an inmate to
review the facts regarding his case for accuracy and present additional information on his own
behalf because they “adequately safeguard[] against serious risks of error and thus satisf [y] due
process”); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (noting that the “central meaning of
procedural due process” is that affected parties “are entitled to be heard” and that notice is
necessary for a hearing).
107 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 227-28.
108 See 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972). To satisfy due process, the Morrissey Court required
procedures including:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of
evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
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Court contextualized its heightened procedural standard in terms of the
“grievous loss” involved in parole revocation, noting the strong similarity
between a parolee’s liberty and that of a free citizen.109
Two years later, in Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court expanded upon the
heightened procedural requirements announced in Morrissey when it
addressed procedural requirements for the punitive revocation of good-time
credits.110 At issue in Wolff was a decision by prison authorities to revoke—as
punishment—an inmate’s good-time credits when good-time credits would
otherwise yield a sentence reduction.111 The Court held that to satisfy the
Due Process Clause, prison officials must provide written notice to an
inmate facing loss of good-time credits informing him of the charges.112 The
Court also held that prison officials must allow an inmate a period of time—
specifically, no less than twenty-four hours after receiving notice—to
prepare a defense.113 Echoing the requirement announced in Morrissey, the
Court required the factfinders to produce a written statement explaining
their decisions.114 Wolff thus established heightened procedural requirements
for prison officials undertaking disciplinary action.115
The Court retreated from its strong procedural stance in Wolff two years
later, when it decided Meachum v. Fano. 116 Meachum examined the
procedures required for the transfer of an inmate from one institution to
another.117 The Court declined to find a constitutional liberty interest at
witnesses . . . ; (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole
board . . . ; and (f ) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied
on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489.
109 Id. at 481-82.
110 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); see also Julia M. Glencer, Comment, An “Atypical and Significant”
Barrier to Prisoners’ Procedural Due Process Claims Based on State-Created Liberty Interests, 100 DICK.
L. REV. 861, 878 (1996) (“The Wolff Court revolutionized prisoners’ rights litigation by clarifying
that the Morrissey due process requirements did reach inner-prison disciplinary proceedings.”);
Jacob, supra note 83, at 1219 (calling Wolff “the first major case after Morrissey to examine the due
process [rights] of prisoners”).
111 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 547 (noting that forfeiture of good-time credits “affects the term of
confinement,” while confinement in a disciplinary cell is only an “alteration of the conditions of
confinement”).
112 Id. at 564.
113 Id. The inmate’s defense could include presenting witnesses and documentary evidence, as
long as doing so is not “unduly hazardous.” Id. at 566.
114 Id. at 564-65.
115 See Lee, supra note 43, at 794 (discussing the Court’s approach in Wolff and noting that it
“narrowly prescribed specific procedures that it deemed necessary to protect prisoners’ due process
rights in disciplinary proceedings”).
116 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976).
117 Id. at 216-17.
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stake and held that a prisoner is not entitled to any procedural measures
before a transfer between prisons in the same state.118 Moreover, the Court
distinguished Meachum from Wolff and Morrissey by noting the administrative, rather than punitive, nature of the state action.119 Accordingly, the
Court implied that administrative decisions involving prisoners face lower
procedural hurdles than punitive decisions.120
The Court expressly affirmed this distinction in Wilkinson.121 The Court
distinguished an administrative segregation decision from the punitive
deprivations in Morrissey and Wolff, which called for “more formal,
adversary-type procedures.”122 Concluding that an administrative decision
to place an inmate in segregation “draws more on the experience of prison
administrators” and “implicates the safety of other inmates and prison
personnel,” the Court was satisfied with the “informal, nonadversary”
procedures already in place.123
Even though the Wilkinson Court found that inmates had a protectable
liberty interest in avoiding placement in administrative segregation, the
Court found that only minimal procedural protections are required. 124
Indeed, the Wilkinson Court affirmed the procedural requirements for
administrative segregation placement articulated in Hewitt—namely, that
officials provide “some sort of periodic review”125 of an inmate’s placement,
along with notice and a rebuttal opportunity for the initial placement
decision.126
The Wilkinson Court endorsed the segregation procedures used by Ohio
prison administrators, concluding in part that additional safeguards would
be difficult and costly to implement.127 The outcome in Wilkinson suggests
118
119

Id. at 225-26.
See id. at 225-27 (“Transfers between institutions . . . are made for a variety of reasons
and often involve no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve institutional
security or the safety and welfare of the inmate.”).
120 See id. at 228-29 (expressing skepticism of judicial involvement in “the day-to-day
functioning of state prisons”).
121 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228 (2005) (“Ohio is not . . . attempting to
remove an inmate from free society for a specific parole violation . . . or to revoke good-time
credits for specific, serious misbehavior . . . , where more formal, adversary-type procedures
might be useful.” (citations omitted)).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 228-29.
124 Id. at 225 (“Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition,
so the procedural protections to which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where the
right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at all.”).
125 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983).
126 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 229 (affirming the procedural requirements set forth in Hewitt).
127 See id. at 228 (concluding that establishing more formal procedures would be difficult and
add “obvious costs”).
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that the actual liberty interest has minimal significance: the procedural
process due is so flexible—so minimal—that a prisoner’s claim will rarely
satisfy the second prong of the due process inquiry when alternative
procedures would require additional cost.
b. Periodic Review and Adequate Notice: What Does It Actually Mean?
In light of the Court’s standards-based explanation of procedural due
process for administrative segregation decisions, lower courts and scholars
have been left to interpret the meaning of the periodic review and adequate
notice guarantees announced in Wilkinson and Hewitt.128 They rely on the
Supreme Court’s repeated refrain that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”129 Courts have thus rejected annual reviews, concluding
that they are “likely too infrequent to satisfy the [periodic review]
requirements of Hewitt.”130
Scholars argue that due process requires meaningful procedural review
of administrative segregation placement. 131 The Court’s clarification in
Hewitt that “administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for
indefinite confinement of an inmate” supports this claim.132 Lower courts
have therefore rejected procedures that facially satisfy the Court’s mandate
in Wilkinson when they are perfunctory in application.133 The process for
128
129
130

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224-25; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Alston v. Cahill, No. 07-473, 2012 WL 3288923, at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2012); see also
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that annual reviews are
inadequate), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
131 See Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994, 1009 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding the district court’s
ruling that a particular review process for administrative segregation placement was
unconstitutional because it was not meaningful).
132 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9.
133 See Angela A. Allen-Bell, Perception Profiling & Prolonged Solitary Confinement Viewed
Through the Lens of the Angola 3 Case: When Prison Officials Become Judges, Judges Become Visually
Challenged, and Justice Becomes Legally Blind, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763, 795-99 (2012)
(criticizing as inadequate current review procedures of administrative confinement decisions and
arguing that the periodic but cursory evaluations used by most prisons constitute schemes that
“do[] not comport with due process”); Gibbons & Katzenbach, supra note 8, at 465-66
(highlighting the need for meaningful reviews and reporting that prisoners and families lack
confidence in current procedures); Lobel, supra note 18, at 125 (criticizing the typical review
process as a “sham”); Robert M. Ferrier, Note, “An Atypical and Significant Hardship”: The Supermax
Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on Status—A Plea for Procedural Due Process, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 314 (2004) (arguing that Arizona’s practice of placing death row inmates in
supermax confinement conditions is arbitrary and procedurally inadequate); see also Williams, 662
F.3d at 1009 (holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding existing review procedures
were insufficient); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that the
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analyzing the meaningfulness of periodic review, however, remains unclear.
Despite formal review of administrative segregation placement, many
prisoners remain in administrative solitary confinement for prolonged
periods of time.134 Indeed, “the decision is predetermined, the review is a
sham, and there is nothing the prisoner can do to get out of solitary
confinement.”135
Similarly, the minimal requirement that an inmate have notice of his
administrative segregation placement is not a mere formality. As the
Supreme Court explained in Wilkinson, segregated prisoners are entitled to
a statement of the reasons for their placement and retention as “a guide for
future behavior.” 136 In the solitary confinement setting, therefore,
meaningful notice of placement or retention in segregation requires more
than a general statement of the prisoner’s perceived threat level.137 Instead,
as Lobel suggests, the statement must provide information about how the
prisoner can realistically leave segregated confinement and return to the
general prison population.138
Wilkinson jeopardized procedural due process protections for prisoners
placed or kept in segregated confinement for an administrative purpose.
Prisoners facing the severe conditions of segregated placement139 are not
entitled to formal hearings like those the Court required for revocation of
good-time credits in Wolff. Prisoners are, however, entitled to notice of their
placement, timely and meaningful review, an opportunity to rebut the basis
for that placement, and information about how they can lower their security
threat level to leave segregated confinement.140 Despite requiring at least
monthly review procedures were “facially adequate” to protect the inmates’ liberty interests, but
that they did not satisfy due process because they were only perfunctory).
134 According to solitary confinement expert Jules Lobel, “the trend in prolonged supermax
confinement is for the federal or state government to simply designate certain prisoners for
essentially lifetime or very long solitary confinement. In such cases, the due process requirement
of periodic review becomes meaningless.” Lobel, supra note 18, at 125.
135 Id. at 125-26.
136 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 226 (2005); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb.
Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (finding that notice of the reasons for parole
revocation serves as a “guide to the inmate for his future behavior”); Benitez v. Wolff, 985 F.2d
662, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that an inmate did not have adequate time to review the
notice of charges against him, despite receiving the notice more than twenty-four hours in
advance, because he was moved shortly after receiving the notice and was not allowed to take the
notice with him).
137 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 127.
138 Id. This requirement is addressed in the Ashker complaint, see Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 16, at 44-45, and discussed in Section II.B, infra.
139 See supra subsection I.B.1.c.
140 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 (1983) (highlighting the features of a satisfactory
process); see also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225-26 (same).
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some procedural safeguards, the broad deference the Court has repeatedly
afforded to administrative segregation decisions has rendered the
procedures perfunctory and meaningless. They are a protection in name
only.141
II. ASHKER AND THE DAWN OF A NEW ERA OF PRISONER
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In light of the limitations the Supreme Court has imposed on a
prisoner’s assertion of a protectable liberty interest 142 and the minimal
procedural protections afforded prisoners with a valid liberty interest,143
prisoner–litigants in solitary confinement are adopting new litigation
strategies to work creatively within the narrow framework. This Part first
outlines two recent lower court decisions in which prisoners alleged due
process violations in segregated confinement conditions. It then examines a
pending class action suit, Ashker v. Brown,144 and the implications of the
Ashker strategy for prisoner procedural due process protection. This Part
concludes by considering the actual utility of the Supreme Court’s current
approach to prisoner procedural due process claims in light of the reaction
in the lower courts.
A. Challenges to Segregation Post-Wilkinson: Two Recent Cases
The following two cases highlight two recent approaches by prisoner–
litigants in administrative segregation. They involve prisoners placed in
segregation for prolonged periods of time and subjected to the severe
deprivations that accompany solitary confinement. In both cases, the
plaintiff–prisoners challenged the procedures relating to their placement in
harsh confinement conditions and relied on creative interpretations of the
Supreme Court’s case law to make their arguments. In their opinions, both
courts highlight the Hewitt Court’s caution that “administrative segregation
may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate,”

141 See Lobel, supra note 18, at 128 (discussing Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D.
Ohio 2002), a class action filed after the Wilkinson decision, in which prisoners alleged that OSP
was not following the procedures required by the Supreme Court).
142 See supra subsection I.B.1.c.
143 See supra subsection I.B.2.a.
144 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 3 (seeking declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief compelling defendants to provide prisoners with meaningful
review).
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suggesting a revival of the Hewitt procedural framework left intact by the
Wilkinson Court.145
1. Proctor v. LeClaire, Selby v. Caruso, and the Problem with the
Periodic Review Standard
a. Proctor v. LeClaire
Proctor v. LeClaire146 involved a procedural due process claim regarding
the nature of the periodic review of an inmate’s administrative segregation
placement. 147 Patrick Proctor, the plaintiff, had been in administrative
segregation since 2003 and in disciplinary segregation for nine years before
that. 148 Proctor brought suit in 2009, alleging that his continued
confinement in the severe conditions of administrative segregation violated
his due process rights because he only received “sham, perfunctory and
meaningless [p]eriodic [r]eviews.”149
Proctor acknowledged that he had been receiving reviews of his
placement every sixty days, as required by New York law.150 He argued,
however, that these reviews were not conducted meaningfully, despite his
efforts to challenge his confinement.151 Proctor alleged that the reviews were
not only perfunctory, but also “based on evidence that should have been
expunged from his record.”152 In addition, Proctor argued that the reasons
given by prison officials for his continued placement in administrative
segregation were “false or misleading.”153

145 See Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing the “indefinite confinement”
language from Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9); Proctor v. LeClaire, 715 F.3d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 2013)
(same); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229 (2005) (“Although Sandin abrogated . . .
Hewitt’s methodology for establishing the liberty interest, [Hewitt] remain[s] instructive for [its]
discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards.”). Prisoner–litigants’ reliance on the
statement in Hewitt is perhaps unexpected because, despite finding that the inmate had a
protectable liberty interest, the Hewitt Court ultimately concluded that the “informal,
nonadversary” review of the placement decision was sufficient. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476.
146 715 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 2013).
147 See id. at 404-05. The resolution of the case is still pending. Although the district court
originally dismissed the action on issue and claim preclusion grounds, the Second Circuit vacated
the judgment on April 25, 2013, see id. at 417, and the substantive legal issues currently remain
unresolved.
148 Id. at 405-06.
149 Civil Rights Complaint at 18, Proctor v. LeClaire, No. 09-1114 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009).
150 See Proctor, 715 F.3d at 405, 408.
151 See Civil Rights Complaint, supra note 149, at 18, exh. A (describing and reflecting
Proctor’s efforts to obtain meaningful review).
152 Proctor, 715 F.3d at 414.
153 Id.
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b. Selby v. Caruso
Selby v. Caruso similarly involved a procedural due process challenge
regarding the nature of review afforded to an inmate placed in
administrative segregation for a prolonged period.154 Charles Selby sued
Michigan Department of Corrections officials in 2009 for violating his
procedural due process rights.155 He alleged that during his nearly thirteen
years in administrative segregation, he did not receive any meaningful
review of his placement.156 He was placed in administrative segregation
based on a determination that he posed a “serious escape risk.” 157 Like
Proctor, Selby received regular “[r]eports about [his] confinement in
administrative segregation.”158 Selby alleged, however, that the reports were
a “sham,” because the outcome of the review was “preordained” given a hold
placed on him by a prison administrator.159 He claimed he never received
information about the nature of the hold, and prison administrators denied
that the hold had any impact on their reviews.160
In reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
remanding for trial,161 the Sixth Circuit concluded that “[g]enuine issues of
material fact exist on this record concerning whether Selby received
meaningful periodic reviews and whether the prison officials’ decision to
continue Selby’s confinement in administrative segregation for nearly
thirteen years was supported by ‘some evidence.’”162 The court noted that if
Selby’s allegations about the hold were correct, the reviews, although
periodic, would be “perfunctory and meaningless.”163 The court suggested,
relying on Hewitt, that the meaningful review requirement meant
something more than just periodic review.164

154
155
156

734 F.3d 554, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556-57. Selby was released into the general prison population in 2011, approximately
eighteen months after he filed suit. Id. at 557.
157 Id. at 556.
158 Id. at 557. In contrast with the reviews provided to the plaintiff in Proctor, Selby’s reviews
occurred monthly. Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 This procedural posture pertains specifically to Selby’s due process claim. See id. at 559-61.
162 Id. at 559.
163 Id. at 560.
164 Id. at 559 (“We know from longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence that prison
officials must engage in some sort of periodic review . . . and that the officials’ decision to
continue such confinement must be supported by ‘some evidence.’”).
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2. Proctor, Selby, and the State of Meaningful Review
Both Proctor and Selby highlight the problem with courts’ current
treatment of procedural due process protections in the context of
segregation. Even though states are required to provide meaningful review
of segregation decisions, the Supreme Court has not specified what sort of
review satisfies the standard.165 As a result of the Court’s deference to prison
officials and reliance on the “flexibility” of the constitutional requirement,
meaningful review has become meaningless. State prison officials, such as
the officials overseeing the New York segregated housing unit in Proctor and
the Michigan administrative segregation unit in Selby, argue that the
facilities satisfy this procedural requirement so long as reviews are
“periodic.” This seems to mean more often than annually, but the specific
frequency is left up to the institutions themselves.
As Proctor’s argument demonstrates, however, there seems to be room
within this procedural requirement for litigators to make out a due process
challenge. By focusing on the review itself, litigators can push courts to
interpret and define the meaningful review requirement beyond simply
specifying its frequency. The Sixth Circuit’s observation in Selby that
perfunctory reviews—regardless of their frequency—are insufficient, lends
weight to this position.
Courts ought to scrutinize the nature of the review processes that keep
inmates like Proctor and Selby confined for such long periods of time.
Equipped with the directive of the Hewitt Court—namely, that
administrative segregation must not be a pretext for indefinite solitary
confinement—litigants experiencing prolonged administrative solitary
confinement have additional authority backing their meaningful review
claims. Through cases challenging the quality of prison officials’ review of
prolonged administrative segregation, courts should define the nature of the
procedural guarantee and cease granting deference to prison officials.
B. New Approach: Ashker v. Brown
1. Background
The pending California case, Ashker v. Brown, demonstrates a new
litigation approach available to prisoners in prolonged administrative
solitary confinement who seek procedural due process relief.166 The case
involves a class of inmates currently housed in Pelican Bay State Prison’s
165
166

See supra subsection I.B.2.b.
See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16.
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Security Housing Unit (SHU), a supermax prison located in a remote area
of California.167 The inmates have been held in the SHU for prolonged
periods, ranging from eleven to twenty-two years.168 Some of the plaintiffs
were transferred from other segregation units and have therefore spent even
longer periods of time in isolated confinement, with one plaintiff having
been held in isolation for a total of twenty-eight years.169 Pelican Bay’s
SHU is considered one of the most restrictive facilities in the country.170
Alleged gang members form the largest group of Pelican Bay SHU
inmates and constitute the class members in the case. 171 The California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) classifies their
segregation placements as administrative.172 Despite the CDCR’s conclusions,
the perceived threat of the plaintiffs is unfounded: the plaintiffs’
incarceration records lack a history of violent behavior (presumably an
indicator of future violence),173 and their alleged gang associations “have
hardly any predictive value for a prisoner’s likelihood to be violent.”174
Furthermore, the CDCR’s definition of gang affiliation is so broad that
“anyone who plans with anyone else on breaking a prison rule can be
deemed a gang member.”175
Inmates are assigned to the SHU after being identified as gang affiliates
by the CDCR through a process called “prison gang validation.”176 Rather

167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 8.
See Shaiq, supra note 6, at 337 (noting alleged gang members “compris[e] two out of every
three SHU prisoners” and are the largest group of SHU inmates); see also Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 2-6.
172 See Jesse Wegman, Op-Ed., Climbing Out of the Hole, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, § 4, at 10
(“The inmates are isolated because prison officials have determined that they pose a threat to the
safety of the guards and other prisoners, . . . despite the fact that such [gang] associations have
hardly any predictive value for a prisoner’s likelihood to be violent.”).
173 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 24 (“[M]any plaintiffs have
demonstrated their ability to follow prison rules by avoiding any significant prison misconduct.”).
174 Wegman, supra note 172.
175 Shaiq, supra note 6, at 338. Shaiq explains that the California Code of Regulations
considers a gang to be “‘any ongoing formal or informal organization, association or group of three
or more persons which has a common name or identifying sign or symbol whose members and/or
associates’ engage ‘on behalf of that organization, association or group, in two or more acts which
include, planning, organizing, threatening, financing, soliciting, or committing unlawful acts or acts
of misconduct.’” Id. at 337-38 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000 (2013)). Shaiq points out
that tattoos, photographs, lists, and visits from documented gang members are all sufficient
evidence of an inmate’s membership in a gang. Id. at 338.
176 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 19; see also CAL. DEP’T OF
CORR. & REHAB., OPERATIONS MANUAL § 52070.20 (2009), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
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than looking to the prisoner’s actual behavior, the validation analysis merely
requires some evidence that the individual has associated with a gang.177 In
fact, both inmates validated as gang members and inmates validated as gang
“associates” (defined by the CDCR as someone who interacts with members
or associates of a gang “periodically”), are similarly “subject to indefinite
SHU placement.” 178 Once validated, these prisoners serve an indefinite
term in the SHU, with review of their active gang status occurring every six
years.179
A classification committee reviews the prisoner’s segregation status
every 180 days.180 Although the articulated purpose for this state-mandated
review is to consider the inmate’s suitability for release into the general
population,181 in practice, the review merely consists of an examination of
the paperwork in the inmate’s file and a request for the inmate to
“debrief ”—in other words, snitch on other prisoners.182 No review of the
inmate’s gang association or conduct occurs at these reviews of the inmate’s
validation.183
At the end of an inmate’s six-year term in the SHU, the classification
committee reviews the inmate’s gang affiliation to determine whether the
inmate’s status is still active.184 The plaintiffs, however, allege that “the sixyear review results in SHU retention even though the prison can produce
no evidence (or even allegations) of gang activity.” 185 According to the
complaint, the committee has based a decision to deny inactive status on as
little as finding artwork containing Aztec symbols in an inmate’s cell.186 In
another instance, officials sought to consider evidence that an inmate had
been seen talking with a validated member of a different gang.187 Two of the

Regulations/Adult_Operations/docs/DOM/dom%202014/2014%20DOM.pdf (explaining the definition
of and purpose of “[v]alidation of [g]ang [a]ffiliates”).
177 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 19.
178 Id.
179 See id. (“CDCR places prisoners who have been validated as gang affiliates into the above
conditions in SHU for an indefinite term, served in repeatedly renewed six-year increments.”).
180 Id. at 20.
181 Id. (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3341.5(c)(2)(A)(1) (2012)).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See id. at 21 (noting also that the “CDCR routinely and regularly denies inactive status to
prisoners even where there is no evidence . . . of any gang activity”).
186 Id. at 25.
187 Id. at 22. For a description of other evidence allegedly used by the committee to deny inactive status, see id. at 22-25.
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plaintiffs allege that the CDCR will continue to deny them inactive status
unless and until they debrief.188
In light of these policies, the plaintiffs believe that their only way out of
the SHU is either to debrief or die.189 As the Wilkinson Court acknowledged
in its description of the dangers of the prison system, however, “[t]estifying
against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite one’s own
death sentence.”190 As a result, confinement in the SHU is not only assigned
for an indefinite period, but also results in an unconscionably long stay.191
2. Legal Argument
The plaintiffs allege the procedures in place to assign them to the SHU
and the review process that keeps them there violate their due process
rights.192 The plaintiffs will likely meet the first prong of the due process
analysis—establishing a constitutionally protectable liberty interest—which
requires demonstrating atypical and significant hardship compared with the
regular incidences of prison life. 193 As the plaintiffs allege in their
complaint, the harsh solitary confinement conditions that inmates at Pelican
Bay SHU experience are atypical and significant, especially when compared
with the conditions of solitary confinement in other states and countries.194
Although the Wilkinson Court did not find that placement in solitary
confinement itself constitutes an atypical and significant hardship, the
Court found a liberty interest given the distinguishing features of the

188
189
190
191

Id. at 21.
Id. at 26.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005).
See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 8-9 (detailing the various
lengths of time the plaintiffs have spent in the Pelican Bay SHU and noting that the Pelican Bay
planners assumed prisoners would spend at most eighteen months there).
192 Id. at 43-45.
193 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995) (announcing “atypical and significant
hardship” as the standard against which alleged liberty interests must be measured when they do
not derive from the Due Process Clause itself ).
194 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 2 (“The solitary confinement
regime at Pelican Bay . . . renders California an outlier in this country and in the civilized
world . . . .”). Jules Lobel, the lead attorney for the Ashker plaintiffs and former attorney for the
plaintiffs in Wilkinson, argues that international law requires a meaningful periodic review of longterm solitary confinement. Lobel, supra note 18, at 129-30. In other contexts, the Supreme Court
has recognized international law as persuasive authority. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005) (“[T]he overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death
penalty . . . provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.” (citation
omitted)).
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isolation experience at OSP.195 Despite its remark that the severe isolation
conditions at OSP “likely would apply to most solitary confinement
facilities,” the Court found a liberty interest under the Sandin standard
because OSP placement was indefinite, was reviewed only annually, and
disqualified otherwise eligible inmates from parole consideration.196
The plaintiffs in Ashker point to the indeterminate, indefinite duration
of their confinement at the Pelican Bay SHU and the lack of actual periodic
review of their gang status as evidence implicating a liberty interest similar
to that at issue in Wilkinson.197 In addition, the plaintiffs, seemingly relying
on the Court’s remarks in Wilkinson, allege that an “unwritten policy
prevents any prisoner held in the SHU from being granted parole.”198 The
plaintiffs explain that five of the class members are parole-eligible but have
been informed that they will not be granted parole while housed at the
SHU.199 The presence of both of the factors that the Wilkinson Court used
to find a liberty interest suggests that the plaintiffs should similarly succeed
in satisfying the first prong of the due process test.
Notably, the plaintiffs also allege that SHU assignment prolongs their
sentence of incarceration by denying them the ability to earn good-time
credit or qualify for parole eligibility during their time in the SHU.200 The
plaintiffs therefore appear to argue, in the alternative, that the Court’s
separate parole case law applies. Under this theory, any extension of
sentence length or negative impact on parole eligibility directly implicates
the Due Process Clause.201
The Ashker plaintiffs make two arguments to address the second prong
of the due process analysis. First, plaintiffs argue that the review process
currently in place is, as was argued in Selby and Proctor, perfunctory and

195 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (describing the distinguishing features
of OSP placement and confinement that satisfied the atypical and significant standard).
196 Id.; see also supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing the potentially novel
position the Wilkinson court took regarding parole eligibility and the procedural due process
framework).
197 See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 43. The Ninth Circuit, in
Serrano v. Francis, declined to find that placement in administrative segregation implicates a
liberty interest, but used segregation conditions as a reference for the Sandin analysis. 345 F.3d
1071, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs emphasize that for the prisoners who cannot or do not
debrief, “defendants’ policies result in effectively permanent solitary confinement.” Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 18.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See supra subsection I.B.2.a.
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meaningless. 202 Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the implications of
placement on their parole eligibility and good-time credits renders such
placement punitive and entitles them to the heightened procedures
announced in Wolff.203
In their first argument, the plaintiffs emphasize the lack of meaningful
review of their placement—even under the minimal procedures required in
Hewitt.204 In fact, the plaintiffs argue that the current review process fails to
satisfy even the frequency requirement of periodic review.205 The plaintiffs
note that the only actual review of their gang status—the very classification
justifying their placement in the SHU—occurs every six years.206 Given the
allegations, the court seems obliged to examine the actual review procedures
the CDCR employs.
In addition, the plaintiffs explain the lack of real opportunities to leave
the SHU, arguing that the CDCR’s pressure to debrief—an unrealistic
requirement207—and failure to detail the basis for their placement decisions
violate the adequate notice requirement of meaningful review. 208 The
plaintiffs point to decisions denying them gang-inactive status to
demonstrate that the review is “misleading and meaningless.”209
The plaintiffs’ second argument regarding their process due is that the
punitive nature of their SHU placement entitles them to the heightened
protections announced in Wolff. The plaintiffs point out that their
confinement is extended by placement in the SHU, because they are unable
202 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint at
12, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-5796 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013), ECF No. 178 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss]; Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra
note 16, at 44-45.
203 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 202, at 12; Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 44-45.
204 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 20-26.
205 Id. at 20-21, 43.
206 Id. at 20-21.
207 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. As the Ashker plaintiffs argue, CDCR’s single
opportunity to leave the SHU is purely theoretical. Debriefing is not an option for most of the
SHU inmates who do not want to risk their lives. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 16, at 40. CDCR’s policy simply provides SHU inmates with a catch-22: remain in the
harsh conditions of solitary confinement at Pelican Bay or debrief and risk their lives in the
general prison population.
208 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 26, 43-44.
209 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 202, at 15. The
lawsuit appears to have had some impact on the CDCR’s approach to SHU placement and review
already. See, e.g., Sharon Bernstein, Amid Criticism, California to Modify Solitary Confinement Rules,
REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-usa-californiaprisons-idUSBREA1C02220140213 (discussing a proposal to overhaul SHU assignment that would
eliminate SHU placement based on gang association alone).
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to earn good-time credits or qualify for parole—despite otherwise being
parole-eligible.210 Plaintiffs argue that in light of the punitive effects of their
segregation placements, they ought to receive the procedural guarantees
that attach to punitive sanctions in the prison context.211 The plaintiffs
compare the deprivations they face with those at issue in Wolff—specifically,
the loss of good-time credit—and assert their right to the formal adversarytype hearings the Wolff Court required.212 Further, the plaintiffs argue that
the loss of good-time credits, the “extraordinary length of time Plaintiffs
have been confined” at the Pelican Bay SHU, and the harsh conditions
involved in placement there combine to make “clear that P[elican] B[ay]SHU assignment is a punitive rather than administrative measure.”213
3. Implications
By adopting the meaningless review strategy used in both Selby and
Proctor, the Ashker plaintiffs reaffirm the role that interpretation of
“meaningful review” can have in the development of solitary confinement
case law. Even within the minimal procedures afforded to prisoners in the
administrative segregation context, the plaintiffs’ argument could gain
traction. The court is faced with a set of facts that evokes the Hewitt
instruction that segregation must not be a “pretext for indefinite
confinement.”214 As a result, the plaintiffs’ focus on the inadequacy of the
review process can invoke the court’s scrutiny of the actual procedures
afforded to prisoners. Similarly, by highlighting that their only option for
relief from SHU placement is to debrief, the plaintiffs invite the court to
provide a more substantive formulation of the meaningful review
requirement—beyond a mere frequency standard. This task would require
the court to examine the actual practicability of the procedures in place.
The plaintiffs’ alternative argument—that the disqualifying effects of
SHU placement render it punitive—highlights the problems with the
current distinction between administrative and disciplinary segregation.
Indeed, the punitive nature of the plaintiffs’ placement suggests that the
current doctrinal approach to prisoner procedural due process challenges to
solitary confinement placement improperly distinguishes between
administrative and disciplinary segregation classifications.

210
211
212
213
214

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 18.
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 202, at 12-13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983).
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The plaintiffs’ argument challenges the current approach, which permits
courts to rely on a prison’s internal classifications for segregated
confinement without scrutinizing the basis for the categorizations or the
opportunities for return into the general prison population. As Ashker
implies, prison administrators may be aware of the disciplinary–
administrative distinction and take advantage of the lesser protections
afforded to administratively segregated prisoners.215 This suggests that the
problems that plagued the state positive–law era can similarly infect solitary
confinement due process jurisprudence today.
Rather than rely on the state’s classification of segregation, courts ought
to look to the nature of the conditions and the impact that the placement
has on the prisoner’s experience and sentence. The plaintiffs’ experiences in
administrative segregation illustrate the harsh tactics that prisons officials
use in even a nondisciplinary context. The lack of proportionality between
the alleged threat an inmate poses and the tactics that prison officials
employ to counter the purported threat casts doubt on the assumptions that
courts have made in distinguishing between administrative and disciplinary
segregation procedures. Indeed, the punitive implications of plaintiffs’
segregation suggest that the deference that courts have traditionally granted
to prison officials is not well-suited to administrative segregation.
III. DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL ALTERNATIVE
The Ashker complaint highlights the limitations of the current due
process framework for prisoners serving effectively indefinite periods in
solitary confinement for “administrative” reasons and serves as an example
of the legal creativity that the prisoners must use to advocate for heightened
procedural fairness. Given this doctrinal limitation and the creativity it has
encouraged, this Part proposes an alternative procedural framework for
long-term solitary confinement placement and review.
A. The Standard Must Acknowledge the Harm at Stake
The science is clear: solitary confinement causes permanent psychological
and physiological damage.216 Harms from prolonged solitary confinement
215 Focusing on the context of criminal procedure, Carol Steiker argues, that when “decision
rules”—that is, rules properly known by the courts, such as standing doctrine—become known to
the state agents they regulate, the state agents may alter their conduct. Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2466, 2543 (1996).
216 See SHARON SHALEV, A SOURCEBOOK ON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 15-16 (2008),
available at http://www.solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/sourcebook_web.pdf (listing various
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include “florid delirium” or “a confusional psychosis with intense agitation,
fearfulness, and disorganization” and serious psychological damage even in
inmates who enter prison with higher-than-normal psychological resiliency.217
Predictably, the psychological harm is even greater when inmates enter
solitary confinement with existing mental illness or emotional fragility, as is
the case with many inmates in segregation in general and in Pelican Bay’s
SHU in particular.218
Courts should consider the permanent harm that solitary confinement
causes when determining whether a liberty interest exists in the administrative
segregation context and when identifying the appropriate level of
procedural due process. Even if an inmate is placed in solitary confinement
for an administrative reason—itself a problematic distinction 219 —courts
cannot ignore the permanent harm the placement causes to the inmate.
Even under the Court’s current formulation of the liberty interest
standard, the permanent harm inherent in solitary confinement must be a
primary consideration. Indeed, there is space within the “atypical and
significant hardship” standard (although it arguably strays from the libertyinterest-as-hardship approach) for courts to recognize the permanent harm
caused by solitary confinement as a significant hardship under Sandin.220
The science is conclusive, and courts must not ignore it when considering
physiological and psychological effects of solitary confinement, including heart palpitations,
insomnia, perceptual distortions, paranoia, and psychosis); Allen-Bell, supra note 133, at 769
(“There is no shortage of information establishing the adverse medical affects of prolonged
solitary confinement.”); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 325, 353 (2006) (discussing the long-term effects of solitary and small group
confinement, including “persistent symptoms of post traumatic stress . . . [and] lasting
personality changes—especially including a continuing pattern of intolerance of social interaction,
leaving the individual socially impoverished and withdrawn, subtly angry and fearful when forced
into social interaction”); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 132-37 (2003) (evaluating the specific harms from
confinement in the Pelican Bay SHU and noting that “there is not a single published study of
solitary or supermax-like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasting for longer than
10 days, where participants were unable to terminate their isolation at will, that failed to result in
negative psychological effects”).
217 See Grassian, supra note 216, at 354.
218 See id. at 349 (explaining the findings from an examination of forty-nine inmates at
Pelican Bay in the early 1990s and observing a “high incidence of preexisting central nervous
system dysfunction” among inmates in the Pelican Bay SHU); Craig Haney: Solitary Confinement Is
a “Tried-and-True” Torture Device, FRONTLINE (Apr. 22, 2014, 9:42 PM), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/locked-up-in-america/craig-haney-solitary-confinement-is-atried-and-true-torture-device/, archived at http://perma.cc/PG7A-CZC8 (reporting that Haney
was “taken aback by the number of prisoners who appeared to be mentally ill” at Pelican Bay, even
though “Pelican Bay was not supposed to be a place that was designed to house the mentally ill”).
219 See supra subsection I.B.2.a.
220 For a discussion of the standard, see supra subsection I.B.1.b.
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whether a constitutionally protectable liberty interest exists in avoiding
administrative segregation placement. 221 But the atypical and significant
hardship analysis should not apply to solitary confinement placement and
review. Given the extent of the injury wrought upon the inmate, the liberty
interest analysis must focus only on the significance of the harm and not the
typicality of the practice. Like prison practices that extend an inmate’s
sentence, the determination of a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in avoiding solitary confinement should remain distinct from the Sandin
approach. By focusing on the nature and extent of the deprivation at stake
and not on its typicality or significance among prisoners, courts would be
better able to consider the crux of the interest at stake in solitary
confinement placement: the permanent harm it causes.
Even if the Sandin standard is not abandoned, however, the extent of the
injury caused by solitary confinement must remain a principal
consideration. Because the practice is inherently harmful, it should not be
dismissed as simply a common experience of imprisonment, as the Supreme
Court did in Sandin. 222 The rising outcry against solitary confinement
challenges the Court’s view that some solitary confinement is a common and
expected element of the carceral experience.223 Activists and international
commentators have decried America’s widespread use of solitary
confinement as torture.224 But prison rights advocates are no longer alone;
prison administrators have begun to condemn the practice as well.
Mississippi closed its supermax unit in 2010; Illinois, Maine, Ohio, and
Washington have begun to rethink long-term isolation incarceration.225 The
Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections has
committed to lowering the percentage of the state’s prison population
221 Advocates for the abolition of solitary confinement have adopted the term “SHU
syndrome” to describe the various types of permanent damage caused by solitary confinement. See,
e.g., Haney, supra note 216, at 137 (explaining that some of the permanent effects of “SHU
syndrome” include heightened anxiety, memory impairment, and paranoia).
222 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (noting that segregation is not unlike the
common conditions of confinement for most inmates at the prison in question).
223 See id. at 486 (explaining that placement in segregation did not constitute a “major
disruption” in the prisoner’s environment).
224 See, e.g., Shane Bauer, No Way Out, MOTHER JONES, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 22, 23-24
(comparing solitary confinement in Iran with placement in the Pelican Bay SHU); Atul Gawande,
Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 44 (characterizing solitary confinement as torture);
cf. Grassian, supra note 216, at 343-46 (revealing the similar conditions of sensory deprivation that
incarcerated inmates and prisoners of war face while held in solitary confinement).
225 See Erica Goode, Rethinking Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at A1 (“The
transformation of the Mississippi prison has become a focal point for a growing number of states
that are rethinking the use of long-term isolation and re-evaluating how many inmates really
require it, how long they should be kept there and how best to move them out.”).
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housed in solitary confinement to three percent,226 and he recently published
an op-ed in the New York Times describing his own twenty-hour experience in
a Colorado solitary confinement unit. 227 Similarly, a recent agreement
between the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) and the State of
New York bars solitary confinement for minors, pregnant women, and the
developmentally disabled in the state’s prison system.228 Given these recent
developments, even when courts apply the “atypical and significant”
standard articulated in Sandin, they can no longer take the typicality of
solitary confinement for granted.
If the Sandin liberty interest standard persists, however, courts and
segregated inmates should no longer rely on the vague application of the
standard to administrative segregation articulated by the Wilkinson Court.229
Instead, states’ reduction in solitary confinement, combined with data
showing the permanent psychological damage inherent from the practice,
renders solitary confinement firmly within the Sandin conception of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest.
B. Courts Must Scrutinize the Procedures Employed by Prisons
Given the inherent harm solitary confinement causes, the courts must
no longer afford prison administrators the traditional deference in
segregation decisions. Courts must scrutinize both the procedures for
administrative segregation placement and review, as well as the actual threat
that the inmate facing segregation placement poses. Deference to prison
administrators’ guarantees of process cannot suffice.
Courts must evaluate the procedures prison officials use to place an
inmate in solitary confinement. Because many prison officials point to an
inmate’s dangerousness as justification for placement in administrative
segregation, courts should scrutinize the method used to deem inmates
dangerous. For placement based on gang affiliation, as is the case with the
226 See Allison Sherry, Prisons Chief in D.C. to Push for Solitary Reform, DENVER POST, Feb.
26, 2014, at 4A (reporting on Colorado Department of Corrections Executive Director Rick
Raemisch’s administrative segregation reforms).
227 Rick Raemisch, My Night in Solitary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2014, at A25 (“When I finally
left my cell at 3 p.m., I felt even more urgency for reform. If we can’t eliminate solitary
confinement, at least we can strive to greatly reduce its use.”).
228 See Katie Rose Quandt, Is This the Beginning of the End for Solitary Confinement?, MOTHER
JONES (Feb. 26, 2014, 8:10 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2014/02/children-pregnantwomen-developmentally-disabled-solitary-confinement-reform-new-york, archived at http://perma.cc/
A253-JYRJ (discussing the agreement reached between New York State’s Department of
Community Corrections and the NYCLU on February 19, 2014).
229 See supra subsection I.B.1.c.
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Ashker plaintiffs, 230 courts should require prison officials to produce an
explanation for their decision that an inmate is a gang member or associate
and to provide additional information about how the particular inmate is a
threat in the general prison population. A sufficient explanation would
reference specific actions and characteristics of an individual inmate. For
example, prison officials should not be able to remove an inmate to
segregation based solely on the inmate’s possession of drawings that suggest
gang affiliation. Mere affiliation is not strongly correlated with future
violence,231 and prison officials should distinguish between gang members
and gang associates.232
To take seriously the Hewitt Court’s instruction that segregation must
not be a “pretext for indefinite confinement,”233 courts must also investigate
the review process for an inmate’s return to the general prison population.
A court scrutinizing the Pelican Bay procedures, for example, should ask
whether the six-year and 180-day review processes actually afford inmates a
meaningful opportunity to return to the general prison population. As the
Ashker plaintiffs argue, the current process does not: the 180-day review
process, required by state law, is entirely pro forma, and the six-year review
results in continued segregation placement unless an inmate decides to
snitch.234 Snitching, as even the Supreme Court is aware, is not a realistic
opportunity to return to the general prison population.235 Moreover, courts
should scrutinize the evidence used to conclude that an inmate is a threat.
For example, a drawing with Aztec symbols—evidence used to support one
Pelican Bay plaintiff ’s classification as an active gang member236—cannot
constitute sufficient grounds to retain an inmate in harsh and harmful
conditions of segregation.
C. A Meaningful Balancing Test
Courts using the Mathews balancing test in the segregation context must
abandon the traditional deference given to prison administrators and place
greater weight on the harm to individuals. The government’s remedy of
severe isolation to counter the alleged threat posed by an inmate is often
230
231
232

See supra subsection II.B.1.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text (describing the blunt methods with which
prison officials categorize prisoners based on purported gang involvement).
233 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983).
234 See supra subsection II.B.2.
235 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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disproportionate. Courts must no longer simply accept the notion that
administrative segregation promotes prison safety and preserves prison
resources. Instead, courts should consider whether alternative, lessrestrictive measures are available. As Rick Raemisch, the Executive Director
of the Colorado Department of Corrections, has explained, “just because an
offender needs to be in [a]dministrative [s]egregation for safety reasons,
that doesn’t mean they should sit in a windowless, tiny cell for twenty-three
hours a day. There are other solutions. There are other options.”237 Indeed,
the perceived danger of a prisoner is generally much less than the prison’s
remedy is harmful; the burden therefore should be on the prison to explain
why alternative, less-restrictive measures are inappropriate on an individual
basis.
In addition to examining less-restrictive alternatives to solitary
confinement, courts must consider the permanent harm caused by long-term
isolation as part of the interest-balancing analysis. As the Supreme Court
has explained, due process is flexible and must adapt based on the nature of
the deprivation.238 For solitary confinement—a deprivation that is inherently
harmful and permanently damaging—the court must require heightened
protections. This includes not only a close examination into whether the
prison’s procedures provide an inmate with meaningful process in practice,
but also a reformulation of the current doctrinal approach—particularly the
current reliance on the categorization of an inmate’s placement
(administrative versus punitive or disciplinary) in solitary confinement as a
determinant of the procedure constitutionally required.
Prison administrators should no longer use administrative segregation as
a categorical runaround to avoid the additional procedural requirements for
disciplinary placement. Indeed, courts must require heightened standards
for any segregation placement in accordance with due process—even if they
are unwilling to impose specific requirements. As the Ashker plaintiffs
explain, the distinction between administrative and disciplinary segregation
is improper in two ways. First, in terms of the isolation experience, both
placements result in the same restrictions. Second, in terms of procedural
due process, disciplinary placement is limited to a specific term but requires
heightened process, while administrative placement is often functionally
indefinite yet involves minimal process.239 The initial placement decision
237 Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (forthcoming 2014) (statement of Rick Raemisch, Executive Director of the
Colorado Department of Corrections).
238 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
239 See, e.g., supra subsection II.B.1.
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should be accompanied by formal, adversary-style procedures and should
include inmate-specific evidence proving that solitary confinement is
necessary. The procedural protections in punitive segregation decisions can
provide a helpful model. A meaningful, constitutional standard of
procedure, though, must protect all prisoners facing the harm and severity
of solitary confinement.
In the context of administratively segregated gang-affiliated inmates
whose alleged threat is based on gang affiliation and not mental illness or
behavioral harm, prison officials would have to prove certain conditions to
the court. First, prison officials would have to show that they had a specific
reason for the inmate’s initial placement in solitary confinement. Next,
prison officials would have to show that they have provided a realistic
opportunity for the inmate to leave solitary confinement, conducted an
in-depth individualized review assessing the inmate’s continued threat level,
and found that alternative measures would be inappropriate. By requiring
prison officials to prove these elements in a formal, adversary-style hearing,
courts will be able to prevent inmates from being placed in the inherently
harmful, severely restrictive solitary confinement environment unless
absolutely necessary.
CONCLUSION
The current approach to solitary confinement is inappropriate. In light
of the discrepancy between the seriousness of the deprivation at stake and
the state interests of conserving prison resources and maintaining security,
courts must examine solitary confinement decisions with a critical eye. A
proper approach to constitutional due process challenges to solitary
confinement placement and review would involve the following:
(1) abandon the Sandin liberty-interest analysis for solitary confinement and
find a constitutionally protectable liberty interest in any solitary
confinement placement, especially for a prolonged duration; (2) consider all
categorizations of solitary confinement under a single standard by focusing
on the harshness of the conditions rather than the nature of the
classification; (3) place the burden on the state to prove that placement is
necessary by pointing to inmate-specific, behavioral information and
showing that alternative, cost-effective remedies are not appropriate;
(4) require specific, adversary-style procedures that afford a prisoner
meaningful opportunities to return to the general prison population beyond
mere requests to debrief; (5) conduct a modified Mathews balancing test by
giving greater weight to the deprivation at stake and requiring additional
procedural protections as an inmate’s stay in solitary confinement lengthens;
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and (6) examine the way the state’s formal procedures for placement and
review actually function for individual inmates, taking the duration of an
inmate’s solitary confinement into account. These changes are essential,
given the permanent psychological harm from solitary confinement, the
severity of the isolation, and the overbroad invocation of the government
interest.

